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International capital ﬂ  ows 
and the returns to safe assets in the United States 
2003-2007
A broad array of domestic institutional factors –including problems with the originate-to-distribute model for 
mortgage loans, deteriorating lending standards, deﬁ  ciencies in risk management, conﬂ  icting incentives 
for the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and shortcomings of supervision and regulation– were 
the primary sources of the US housing boom and bust and the associated ﬁ  nancial crisis. In addition, 
the extended rise in US house prices was likely also supported by long-term interest rates (including 
mortgage rates) that were surprisingly low, given the level of short-term rates and other macro fundamentals 
–a development that Greenspan (2005) dubbed a “conundrum.” The “global saving glut” (GSG) hypothesis 
(Bernanke, 2005 and 2007) argues that increased capital inﬂ  ows to the United States from countries 
in which desired saving greatly exceeded desired investment –including Asian emerging markets and 
commodity exporters– were an important reason that US longer-term interest rates during this period 
were lower than expected. 
This essay investigates further the effects of capital inﬂ  ows to the United States on US longer-term interest 
rates; however, we look beyond the overall size of the inﬂ  ows emphasised by the GSG hypothesis to 
examine the implications for US yields of the portfolio preferences of foreign creditors. We present evidence 
that, in the spirit of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), foreign investors during this period tended to 
prefer US assets perceived to be safe. In particular, foreign investors –especially the GSG countries– 
acquired a substantial share of the new issues of US Treasuries, Agency debt, and Agency-sponsored 
mortgage-backed securities. The downward pressure on yields exerted by inﬂ  ows from the GSG countries 
was reinforced by the portfolio preferences of other foreign investors. We focus particularly on the case 
of Europe: although Europe did not run a large current account surplus as did the GSG countries, we 
show that it leveraged up its international balance sheet, issuing external liabilities to ﬁ  nance substantial 
purchases of apparently safe US “private label” mortgage-backed securities and other ﬁ  xed-income 
products. The strong demand for apparently safe assets by both domestic and foreign investors not only 
served to reduce yields on these assets but also provided additional incentives for the US ﬁ  nancial services 
industry to develop structured investment products that “transformed” risky loans into highly-rated securities.
Our ﬁ  ndings do not challenge the view that domestic factors, including those listed above, were the primary 
sources of the housing boom and bust in the United States. However, examining how changes in the 
pattern of international capital ﬂ  ows affected yields on US assets helps provide a deeper understanding 
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T
he US housing boom and the bust that 
followed resulted from the interaction of a 
wide range of factors, including problems 
with the originate-to-distribute model for mortgage 
loans, a deterioration in loan underwriting standards, 
deﬁ  ciencies of risk management among ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, contradictions in the incentive structures 
of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
and problems in the scope and implementation 
of financial supervision and regulation (Dokko 
et al., 2009; Bernanke, 2010). In addition to these 
domestic institutional factors, international capital 
ﬂ  ows likely played a signiﬁ  cant role in helping to 
ﬁ  nance the housing bubble and thus set the stage for 
its subsequent bust. Bernanke (2005, 2007) argued that 
an increase in notional saving relative to investment 
in many emerging market countries had given rise 
to a “global saving glut” (GSG), with capital ﬂ  ows to 
the United States helping hold down US longer-term 
interest rates earlier in the decade. Lower long-term 
interest rates, including mortgage rates, in turn 
contributed to the extended rise in house prices.
In this essay, we build on the GSG hypothesis to 
ﬂ  esh out a more complete story of how international 
capital ﬂ  ows affected the pattern of longer-term 
yields in the United States. First, whereas the GSG 
hypothesis is based on a simple framework in which 
global saving and investment decisions determined 
the return on a single asset, we now consider how 
demands for a range of assets interacted with supplies 
of those assets to help produce declines in certain 
key interest rates. More speciﬁ  cally, in the spirit of 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), we analyse the 
channels through which the demand for apparently 
safe assets by foreigners contributed to their substantial 
acquisitions not only of US Treasury securities 
(Treasuries) and Agency debt (Agencies), but also 
of highly rated, privately issued mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and other structured investment 
products backed by US residential mortgages.1 
Second, whereas the GSG hypothesis focused 
mainly on capital ﬂ  ows into the United States from 
emerging market economies running current account 
surpluses –primarily developing Asian economies 
and oil exporters– this essay shows how capital 
inﬂ  ows from other advanced economies also helped 
to suppress yields on apparently safe assets, including 
mortgages. Finally, we discuss how the demand for 
apparently safe assets inﬂ  uenced their supply, as the 
US ﬁ  nancial services industry developed a multitude 
of structured investment products that transformed 
risky loans into highly rated securities. 
All told, our framework expands the simple GSG 
hypothesis to better explain the role international 
capital ﬂ  ows played in reducing yields on mortgages 
and other apparently safe assets. The analysis focuses 
on the period from 2003 to 2007, which encompasses 
the years when capital inﬂ  ows into the United States 
were strongest, Treasury yields were most depressed, 
and the US housing boom was at its peak. First, we 
verify that the “GSG countries” –that is, emerging Asia 
and Middle Eastern exporters– did indeed evince a 
strong preference for the safest US assets.2 On the 
margin, this preference most likely helped push 
down yields on MBS relative to other assets, as most 
MBS were either guaranteed by the Agencies or sold 
as tranches carrying AAA credit ratings.
Second, the downward pressure on yields exerted by 
inﬂ  ows from the GSG countries was reinforced by 
the portfolio preferences of other foreign investors. 
We focus particularly on the case of Europe. Europe 
did not run a current account surplus as did the GSG 
countries, and thus was not a net exporter of saving 
to the rest of the world. But Europe leveraged up its 
international balance sheet signiﬁ  cantly, issuing, 
among other instruments, considerable sovereign 
debt and bank debt, and using the proceeds to buy 
substantial amounts of highly rated US MBS and 
other ﬁ  xed-income products. In fact, the strong 
preference of the GSG countries for Treasuries 
and Agencies appears to have pushed Europeans 
and other advanced-economy investors, including 
US investors, into apparently safe “private label” MBS.
Finally, the demand for safe assets by investors, both 
domestic and foreign, appears to have engendered 
a strong supply response from US ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. 
In particular, even though a large share of new 
US mortgages during this period were of lower credit 
quality, such as subprime loans, Agency guarantees 
and ﬁ  nancial engineering in the private ﬁ  nancial 
services industry resulted in the overwhelming share 
of mortgage-related securities being rated AAA. 
1  “Agency” refers to the GSEs, most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, designed to promote homeownership by supporting the secondary market for residential 
mortgages. These enterprises both guaranteed MBS and purchased them for their own portfolios. Here and throughout this paper, Agency debt refers to both 
unsecured debt and Agency-guaranteed MBS.
2  In the calculations described later, the GSG countries are taken to include all countries of Asia and the Middle East excluding Japan. This group, although not 
exhaustive, accounts for the lion’s share of investment in the United States by emerging market economies.
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Of course, following the onset of the housing bust 
and ﬁ  nancial crisis, the underlying weakness of these 
securities became evident.
To be clear, in no way do our ﬁ  ndings assign the 
ultimate causality for the housing boom and bust to 
factors outside the United States. Domestic factors, 
including those listed in the ﬁ  rst paragraph of this 
paper, were the primary sources of the boom and 
bust and the associated ﬁ  nancial crisis. However, 
an examination of how changes in the pattern 
of international capital ﬂ  ows affected yields on 
US assets is important for understanding the origins 
and dynamics of the crisis.
1| THE GLOBAL SAVING GLUT 
AND RETURNS TO TREASURY 
  AND AGENCY SECURITIES, 2003-2007
Our research is motivated by two puzzles in the 
evolution of interest rates during the period leading up 
to the ﬁ  nancial crisis. The ﬁ  rst of these puzzles is 
the very low level of long-term Treasury security 
yields, which remained relatively contained even 
as the federal funds rate was raised from 1 percent 
to an eventual level of 5¼ percent (See Chart 1). 
Greenspan (2005) famously referred to this 
development as a “conundrum” and various studies 
showed that bond yields, both in the United States 
and abroad, fell below levels that were consistent 
with standard macro fundamentals such as inﬂ  ation, 
growth in gross domestic product, and ﬁ  scal balances 
(Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu, 2006; Gruber and 
Kamin, 2009). The second, related puzzle is the 
sustained low level of mortgage interest rates, also 
shown in Chart 1. While part of the weakness in these 
rates obviously is due to the low Treasury yields, 
the spread of mortgage rates over Treasury yields 
also edged down over the period, notwithstanding 
a sharp step-up in the pace of mortgage issuance; 
the outstanding stock of MBS and unsecuritised 
mortgages rose from USD 6.4 trillion at the end 
of 2002 to USD 11.1 trillion in 2007.
Of these two puzzles, the ﬁ  rst has probably received 
the most attention. There are a number of explanations 
for the weakness in Treasury yields during this period, 
including declines in risk premiums (perhaps, at least 
initially, associated with the “great moderation”) and 
enhanced demands for long-term assets by pension 
funds and other institutional investors. In addition, 
observers have come to attribute at least part of the 
weakness of long-term bond yields to heavy purchases 
of securities by emerging market economies running 
current account surpluses, particularly emerging Asia 
and the oil exporters. Bernanke (2005, 2007) argued 
that in these countries, investment rates had fallen 
short of desired saving, creating a global saving glut 
that resulted in net capital outﬂ  ows to the rest of the 
world and, as a consequence, declines in long-term 
interest rates. In fact, empirical research for the most 
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Sources: For 10-year Treasury and federal funds, Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.15; for 30-year ﬁ  xed mortgage, Freddie Mac.
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part conﬁ  rms that such acquisitions had a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant downward effect on bond yields.3
What factors led to the excess saving (or dearth of 
investment) and the resulting current account surpluses 
of the GSG countries? Certainly, some of these surpluses 
were due to the 1997-1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis, which 
substantially reduced investment in emerging Asia, as 
well as to the run-up in oil and commodity prices in the 
following decade, which provided commodity exporters 
with more revenues than they could spend productively 
at home in the near term. High saving rates in rapidly 
growing emerging-market economies also contributed 
to the surpluses. Although this analysis helps explain the 
sources of the GSG, it has the shortcoming of treating 
all forms of saving and the resulting capital ﬂ  ows as 
homogeneous. By contrast, an interesting recent body 
of literature has focused on the portfolio preferences 
embodied in capital ﬂ  ows to advanced economies. 
Speciﬁ  cally, it proposes that these emerging market 
economies sought safe, high-quality ﬁ  nancial assets that 
their own governments and ﬁ  nancial systems could 
not provide but were being produced in the advanced 
economies.4 Accordingly, the emerging market economies 
were willing to run current account surpluses in order 
to ﬁ  nance the acquisition of these safe assets (Caballero, 
Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008; Mendoza, Quadrini, and 
Rios-Rull, 2007). Moreover, the notable depth, breadth, 
and apparent safety of US ﬁ  nancial markets led the 
emerging market economies to direct most of their capital 
outﬂ  ows to the United States (Blanchard, Giavazzi, and 
Sa, 2005; Clarida, 2005; Cooper, 2005; Hubbard, 2005). 
If conﬁ  rmed, this hypothesis about the foreign demand 
for safe assets could explain the strength of the capital 
ﬂ  ows from emerging market economies to advanced 
economies with deep capital markets, such as the 
United States. It could also explain why yields on the 
safest US assets, Treasuries and Agencies, were so low.
So, did the emerging market economies running current 
account surpluses generally acquire safe, liquid assets, 
primarily in the United States? The answer appears to 
be yes.5 Chart 2 compares the current account balances 
of three major categories of GSG economies –China, 
other emerging Asian economies, and the Organisation 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)– with 
such measures as are available of their overseas asset 
purchases.6 On net, China’s current account surpluses 
were used almost wholly to acquire assets in the 
United States, more than 80 percent of which consisted 
of very safe Treasuries and Agencies. The other 
emerging Asian economies used their current account 
surpluses to purchase roughly equal amounts of safe 
US assets and European bank deposits. Data on the 
allocation of OPEC assets, unfortunately, is incomplete, 
but it is likely that a good portion of their investments 
abroad went into purchases of US and European assets 
that are held by third-party custodians.
3  Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) ﬁ  nd that Treasury yields declined signiﬁ  cantly during intervals around Japanese interventions to purchase dollars in the 
2000-2004 period. Warnock and Warnock (2009) estimate regressions of US 10-year bond yields on standard macroeconomic variables as well as foreign ofﬁ  cial 
purchases of US Treasury and Agency bonds; they ﬁ  nd that foreign purchases signiﬁ  cantly lowered US Treasury yields, including by some 90 basis points in 2005. 
Conversely, Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006) estimate term structure models of Treasury yields and ﬁ  nd that foreign ofﬁ  cial holdings have no explanatory 
power. Beltran, Kretchmer, Marquez, and Thomas (2010) ﬁ  nd that these models are sensitive to changes in variable deﬁ  nitions and econometric speciﬁ  cation, 
but conclude that, overall, foreign ofﬁ  cial inﬂ  ows likely pushed down Treasury yields. 
4  The demand for these safe assets may have included the demand for international reserves by emerging market economy governments. Most of the acquisitions 
of US assets by GSG countries were in the form of ofﬁ  cial inﬂ  ows. 
5  See also Brender and Pisani, (2010).
6  Comprehensive data on overseas asset purchases by these countries are not available. Therefore, we have attempted to capture these purchases by combining data 
on GSG-country acquisitions of US assets, based on US balance-of-payments, Treasury International Capital (TIC), and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
banking data, with GSG net bank ﬂ  ows to Europe, based on BIS banking data. Unfortunately, data on foreign purchases of non-US securities, which likely 
represent the largest gap in our coverage, are not available for most GSG countries. 
Chart 2
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a) Acquisitions of European and other non-US securities by emerging Asia and 
OPEC are unavailable.
b) Bank ﬂ  ows to Europe calculated from BIS data.
c) Other US assets comprises corporate securities, bank assets, and other 
miscellaneous assets included in the Financial Accounts.
Sources: For current account balance, Haver Analytics and BEA; for balance 
of payments accounts, staff estimates based on Treasury International Capital 
system and Bank for International Settlements banking data.
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Note: In all charts, RMBS refers to residential mortgage-backed securities, CMBS refers to commercial mortgage-backed securities, and ABS refers to all other 
asset-backed securities. 
Source: Staff estimates based on Flow of Funds and Treasury International Capital system data.
Chart 3 examines the portfolio preferences of the GSG 
countries from a different angle, comparing the mix 
of these countries’ holdings of US securities in 2007 to 
the mix of US securities outstanding at that time, and 
produces a reinforcing result. More than three-fourths 
of the GSG countries’ US security holdings consisted 
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of AAA-rated debt, mainly Treasuries and Agencies, 
whereas these categories account for only 36 percent 
of total US securities outstanding.
Moving from the one-asset framework underlying 
the original GSG hypothesis to a multi-asset 
framework that allows for assets of different degrees 
of riskiness, the story of how capital inﬂ  ows from the 
GSG countries ultimately helped to depress interest 
rates on US assets perceived to be safe, including 
mortgages, becomes only a bit more complicated. 
GSG acquisitions of US Treasuries and Agencies took 
these assets off the market, creating a notional scarcity 
that boosted their price and reduced their yield. 
Because GSG investments were for purposes of reserve 
accumulation and guided by considerations of safety 
and liquidity, those countries continued to concentrate 
their holdings in Treasuries and Agencies even as 
the yields on those securities declined. However, 
other investors were now induced to demand more 
of assets considered substitutable with Treasuries and 
Agencies, putting downward pressure on interest rates 
on these private assets as well. Thus, the interest rates 
on conforming mortgages shown in Chart 1 declined 
from their levels at the start of the decade.7
For capital inﬂ  ows from the GSG countries to have put 
downward pressure not only on Treasury and Agency 
yields, but also on returns on other safe assets such as 
highly rated private label MBS, several conditions would 
have had to be met. First, GSG inﬂ  ows would have 
needed to be focused on the safest US assets. Second, 
these inﬂ  ows would have had to have been sizable 
relative to the total net issuance of apparently safe assets 
in the United States. Chart 4 presents mixed evidence 
on this point. It compares gross capital inﬂ  ows into 
apparently “safe” US securities –Treasuries, Agencies, 
and AAA-rated private debt– from a number of regions 
with the increase in the total outstanding stock of safe 
US securities. On the one hand, acquisitions of safe 
assets by the GSG countries stepped up sharply from 
the 1998-2002 period to the 2003-2007 period, both in 
dollar terms and as a fraction of total net issuance. 
On the other hand, during the later period, inﬂ  ows 
7  See also the discussions of the effects of capital inﬂ  ows, especially from the GSG countries, on the US ﬁ  nancial market in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009); 
Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schamnurg (2009); Brender and Pisani (2010); Bertaut, DeMarco, Kamin, and Tryon (2010); and Linde, Martin and Vigfusson (2010).
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a) Of the US AAA inﬂ  ows not accounted for by GSG countries and Europe, Japan purchased about USD 240 billion of Treasuries and USD 130 billion of Agencies, 
and Caribbean offshore centers purchased about USD 55 billion of Agencies and about USD 160 billion of AAA RMBS, CMBS, and ABS.
b) We estimated the change in foreign holdings (both total foreign holdings and Europe’s holdings) of AAA RMBS, CMBS, and ABS by multiplying the change in foreign 
holdings of all asset-backed securities by the share of such securities outstanding that are estimated to be rated AAA during the relevant period.
c) We estimated the change in foreign holdings (both total foreign holdings and Europe’s holdings) of other AAA corporate debt securities by multiplying the change 
in foreign holdings of all securities by a weighted share of such securities outstanding that were rated AAA during the relevant period. For both periods, the weighted 
share averages the shares of ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial debt securities that were rated AAA. For 1998 to 2002, the weights are determined by the growth in ﬁ  nancial 
debt securities outstanding relative to non-ﬁ  nancial debt securities. For 2003 to 2007, when more detailed data on foreign holdings are available, the weights are 
determined by the growth in foreign holdings of ﬁ  nancial debt securities relative to non-ﬁ  nancial debt securities.
Source: Staff estimates based on Flow of Funds, Treasury International Capital system and Dealogic data.
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Chart 5
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Note: The split of European inﬂ  ows to corporate debt into non-AAA asset-backed securities, non-AAA other, AAA asset-backed securities, and AAA other is estimated. 
For a description of the estimation process, see the footnotes to Chart 4.
Source: Staff estimates based on Treasury International Capital system data.
from the GSG countries alone accounted for less than 
one-fourth of the total increase in the stock of safe 
US securities. Therefore, one may question whether 
the effect of GSG inﬂ  ows on the yields of safe US assets 
outside the circle of Treasuries and Agencies, such as 
private label MBS, was all that sizable.
Whereas GSG inﬂ  ows may not have risen sufﬁ  ciently 
to exert a strong downward effect on safe asset yields 
in the private sector, inﬂ  ows from all foreign sources 
may have been large enough to play this role. Chart 4 
shows that such inﬂ  ows rose sharply in the 2003-2007 
period, accounting for more than one-half of the 
net issuance of highly rated US assets. To explain 
the behaviour of safe asset yields in this period, it 
may therefore be useful to expand the analysis to 
include investments by other foreigners besides the 
GSG countries, which we will do in the next section. 
2| THE DEMAND FOR SAFE US ASSETS 
  BY THE ADVANCED FOREIGN ECONOMIES
As indicated above, a large share of the highly rated 
securities issued by US residents from 2003 to 2007 
was sold to foreigners –55 percent. This share 
was even higher than in the 1998-2002 period 
–22 percent– even though total net issuance of 
apparently safe assets rose from USD 3.1 trillion in the 
ﬁ  rst period to USD 4.5 trillion in the second (the net 
issuance of private label AAA-rated asset-backed 
securities outstanding, including MBS, rose from 
USD 0.7 trillion in the ﬁ  rst period to USD 2 trillion in 
the second). That both the level of mortgage interest 
rates and their spread over Treasury yields could 
decline during the recent decade, notwithstanding 
substantial issuance of mortgages, would seem 
attributable, in part, to the strong demand for safe 
assets by foreigners.
Among the advanced economies, the most prominent 
source of gross capital flows into AAA-rated 
US securities from 2003 to 2007 was Europe.8 
As indicated in Chart 4, these acquisitions stepped up 
markedly from the 1998-2002 period and were nearly 
as large as those of the GSG countries. Moreover, 
Chart 4 likely understates Europe’s purchases of 
apparently safe US assets, because it depicts purchases 
of only the safest (AAA-rated) assets. Unlike the 
GSG countries, whose net purchases of US assets 
during the period consisted almost exclusively 
of Treasuries and Agencies, Europeans bought 
a much wider range of assets, shown in Chart 5. 
8  In the statistics presented in this paper, Europe is represented as the euro area plus the United Kingdom, with ﬁ  nancial claims between them netted out.
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In addition to AAA-rated securities, Europeans 
purchased substantial amounts of non-AAA-rated 
securities, particularly corporate bonds –many of 
these, while not receiving the highest rating, were 
nonetheless investment grade. Accordingly, taking 
into account both European purchases of AAA-rated 
securities and those that were just a little less highly 
rated, net European acquisitions of apparently safe 
US assets (more broadly construed) almost certainly 
exceeded those of the GSG countries.
Although Europe’s demands for apparently safe 
US assets thus substantially reinforced those of the 
GSG countries, there were some important differences 
between these two groups of investors. First, as noted 
earlier, European asset preferences were considerably 
broader than those of the GSG countries. Returning 
to Chart 3, it is clear that European investors held a 
much smaller share of their portfolio of US assets in 
Treasuries and Agencies than did the GSG countries, 
while holding a much larger share in AAA-rated 
asset-backed securities (including private label MBS), as 
noted previously, as well as in equities and lower-rated 
debt. In fact, by our estimates, the share of the most 
highly rated securities in Europeans’ US portfolios was 
about the same as in the total amount of US securities 
outstanding.9 As regards the riskier assets, Europeans 
held a smaller share of equities, but appear to have held 
a somewhat larger share of lower-rated instruments, 
including both corporate debt and asset-backed 
securities, than the market capitalisation benchmarks.
Accordingly, European investments in the 
United States seem unlikely to have been motivated 
exclusively by the same objective –the acquisition of 
very safe, liquid ﬁ  nancial assets– as the investments 
of the GSG countries. Rather, European investors 
appear to have targeted a portfolio that was 
riskier than that held by the GSG countries and, 
indeed, broadly similar to the mix of US securities 
outstanding. As to what accounted for the substantial 
increase in European holdings of US assets 
–including MBS– during the 2003-2007 period, a 
number of explanations seem plausible. First, as in 
the United States, reductions in longer-term interest 
rates in Europe undoubtedly generated interest in 
assets such as US MBS that offered slightly higher 
returns while still being highly rated. Second, Europe 
started this period with a relatively pronounced 
degree of “home bias” in its investments, and 
generalised declines in home bias around the world 
as ﬁ  nancial globalisation progressed likely also 
motivated acquisitions of US assets (Bertaut, 2008). 
Third, much of the investment in US MBS around 
the world came from the expanding off-balance-sheet 
vehicles of large global banks, and many of those 
banks were located in Europe (Arteta, Carey, Correa, 
and Kotter, 2009). A ﬁ  nal possibility, advanced by 
Acharya and Schnabl (2010) among others, is that 
the regulatory capital charges levied on banks that 
set up off-balance-sheet conduits to invest in US MBS 
were inadequate, which also served to encourage 
investments in these assets.
A second difference between the GSG and European 
investors is that, whereas the GSG countries were 
running current account surpluses and investing 
their accumulated wealth in US securities, Europe 
was running roughly balanced current accounts 
and was ﬁ  nancing its acquisition of US securities 
through external borrowing. Chart 6 shows the 
growth in Europe’s gross international claims and 
liabilities over the period 2003-2007. The fact that 
Europe was issuing external liabilities and acquiring 
external assets in roughly equal quantities does 
not mean, however, that the net effect of these 
transactions on global ﬁ  nancial markets was a “wash”. 
Chart 6









2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sources: Bank of England and the European Central Bank via Haver Analytics.
9  The composition of foreigners’ holdings of US assets shown in Chart 3 is based on the TIC data. These data specify the types of instruments held –e.g., Treasuries, 
Agencies, corporate debt, MBS, equities– but not their credit ratings. The breakdown of corporate debt and MBS into AAA and non-AAA shares is based on 
the rating shares for the total amounts outstanding of these securities. Because nearly all US MBS was rated AAA (see Section 3 below), our estimate of the 
AAA share of European-held MBS is likely to be approximately correct. For European holdings of corporate debt, the breakdown by credit rating is more uncertain.
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Chart 7 depicts the evolution of Europe’s international 
balance sheet from 2003 to 2007, showing how its 
acquisition of external claims was financed by 
issuance of external liabilities. The composition of 
these ﬂ  ows of claims and liabilities was broadly similar, 
but the rise in claims included signiﬁ  cant amounts of 
asset-backed securities and other complex ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, whereas the rise in liabilities was tilted 
toward traditional securities and bank deposits.
Speciﬁ  cally, and focusing ﬁ  rst on securities, Chart 7 
shows that much of Europe’s issuance of externally 
held securities was in the form of equity and sovereign 
debt, whereas much of its acquisition of external 
securities was in the form of asset-backed securities 
and other debt securities issued by foreign ﬁ  nancial 
corporations, most of which ultimately were issued 
in the United States.10 Turning to transactions among 
banks and other primarily ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
Europe was a net lender abroad to nonbank 
corporations (“net loans to nonbanks and other”), but 
was a net recipient of international interbank ﬂ  ows 
and other deposits from abroad (“net interbank and 
deposits”) during this period.11 As became apparent 
after the ﬁ  nancial crisis broke, many European 
ﬁ  nancial institutions were funding their purchases 
of US assets with short-term dollar-denominated 
liabilities like commercial paper or bank deposits, 
much of which attracted US investors (McGuire and 
von Peter, 2009, Acharya and Schnabl, 2010).12
Thus, even though Europe was not running current 
account surpluses, its ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms and investors 
engaged in a process of intermediation which 
augmented the supply of ﬁ  nancing for MBS and 
related instruments, especially in the United States. 
As Acharya and Schnabl (2010) point out, investment 
inﬂ  ows from current account deﬁ  cit countries as well 
as surplus countries were both quite signiﬁ  cant for 
US ﬁ  nancial markets.
The table below fleshes out the interplay 
between changes in the supply and demand 
for various US securities during the period of 
the housing boom. Between year-end 2003 and 
year-end 2007, the value of total US securities 
outstanding rose about USD 10 trillion, of 
which roughly USD 4.5 trillion was absorbed 
by foreign investors.13 The supply of Treasuries 
and Agencies outstanding rose USD 1.6 trillion, 
and this was fully taken up by foreigners (on net), 
10  Sovereign debt refers to debt issued by governments. While capital inﬂ  ows to purchase European sovereign debt helped ﬁ  nance the acquisition of external assets 
by Europe as a whole, there is no presumption that these inﬂ  ows ﬁ  nanced external asset accumulation by European governments themselves. No sovereign debt 
appears on the asset side of the balance sheet shown in Chart 7 because the change in Europe’s holdings of foreign sovereign debt over the period was negligible.
11  Because the gross two-way ﬂ  ows between Europe and the rest of the world are so large for the “Net loans to nonbanks and other” and “Net interbank and deposits” 
categories, we show only their net ﬂ  ows in Chart 7. “Net loans to nonbanks and other” primarily contains long-term bank loans to nonbank corporations, 
intercompany loans between nonbank corporations, and certain transactions by brokers. “Net interbank and deposits,” in addition to interbank ﬂ  ows and 
deposits from nonbank residents abroad, also includes estimates of net repurchase agreements transacted by nonbank corporations, such as brokers. These two 
categories are derived from and completely cover the “Other Investment” category of the Financial Account of the balance of payments of the euro area and the 
United Kingdom. But in order to present these categories on the basis shown in Chart 7, we also used data from the BIS, individual European countries’ Financial 
Accounts, and the US Financial Account. 
12  It should be noted that not all of the dollar funding of US asset-backed securities by Europeans is captured by these data. In many cases, US subsidiaries of 
European institutions, including their off-balance-sheet vehicles, both received dollar-funding and purchased asset-backed securities in the United States or the 
Caribbean; accordingly, these transactions did not give rise to the cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows with Europe shown in Chart 7. This is particularly true of dollar 
funding through commercial paper vehicles. 
13  Part of the increase in the value of these securities is due to valuation changes for equities; valuation changes for the debt securities were likely fairly small.
Chart 7
Cumulated European cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows a)
January 2003 to June 2007
(USD billions)
Direct investment
Non-financial corporate debt securities
Equity
Other financial corporate debt securities 
RMBS, CMBS, and ABS
Discrepancy
Net interbank and deposits c)
















a) Flows of euro area and the United Kingdom with the rest of the world, net 
of intra-Europe ﬂ  ows.
b) Components of ’Other Investment’ in the euro area and United Kingdom 
Financial Accounts that are not identiﬁ  ed as interbank or deposits from nonbank 
residents, primarily loans to nonbank ﬁ  rms and transactions of brokers.
c) Estimates of interbank ﬂ  ows and deposits from nonbank residents are 
based on the banking component of ’Other Investment’ in the euro area and 
United Kingdom Financial Accounts, and Bank for International Settlements data.
Source: Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.
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of which USD 0.9 trillion was purchased by the 
GSG countries and less than USD 0.2 trillion by 
Europeans. The amount outstanding of AAA-rated 
asset-backed securities rose USD 1.7 trillion, of 
which US residents took USD 1.1 trillion and 
Europeans USD 0.4 trillion.14 All told, as indicated at 
the bottom of the table, the share of the increase in 
the value outstanding of US securities absorbed by 
foreigners ranged from 182 percent for AAA-rated 
corporate securities –that is, foreigners ultimately 
absorbed all of the new issuance of these securities 
and bought some from US residents, too– to only 
25 percent for equities.
Overall, the substantial net capital inﬂ  ows ﬁ  nanced 
by the current account surpluses of the GSG 
countries, coupled with the substantial gross capital 
inﬂ  ows from Europe –as they issued sovereign 
debt and bank deposits, among other liabilities, 
to acquire US structured instruments– probably 
raised net demands for apparently safe US assets. 
Together with the original GSG hypothesis, this 
likely helps to explain why US assets perceived to 
be safe, including MBS, saw little change in yields 
despite tightening monetary policy and heavy 
issuance of mortgages. 
3| CHANGES IN THE SUPPLY 
OF APPARENTLY SAFE US ASSETS
Given the strength of demand for safe US assets, it 
would have been surprising had there not been a 
corresponding increase in their supply. Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (2009) argue that the desire 
to accommodate the demand for safe assets by 
global investors was a prominent factor in a process 
that transformed risky loans into highly rated 
securities. As shown in the top panel of Chart 8, 
during the US housing boom, not only was there a 
surge in origination of new mortgage loans, but the 
share of these loans that were considered riskier 
–subprime and variable-rate prime including alt A– 
rose substantially as well. And yet, remarkably, as 
depicted in the bottom panel, nearly all the surge in 
asset-backed securities outstanding is estimated to 
have been rated AAA.

























Total US securities outstanding, 2003   29,757  3,342 5,969  393  1,439 4,093  254 14,266 
Held by foreign investors 5,239  1,477  571  157  162  1,003  29  1,839 
Of which: Europe 2,182  345  192  74  86  496  15  974 
 GSGs 870  449  198  5  11  33  2  172 
Held by US residents 24,518  1,864  5,398  236  1,277  3,090  225  12,427 
Total US securities outstanding, 2007 40,169  4,113  6,786  425  3,154  5,286  458  19,947 
Held by foreign investors 9,796  2,384  1,384  214  788  1,679  114  3,232 
Of which: Europe 3,978  399  308  126  487  993  71  1,594 
GSGs 2,082 905  656  9  44  72  6  389 
Held by US residents 30,373  1,729  5,402  210  2,366  3,607  344  16,715 
Memo:
Change in foreign held /change in value outstanding (%)   43.8  117.5  99.6 182.0 36.5  56.7 42.0  24.5 
Note: Changes in holdings and securities outstanding include valuation changes. Global saving glut (GSG) countries include Asia (excluding Japan) and the Middle East. 
Sources: Staff estimates based on Flow of Funds and Treasury International Capital system.
14 These  ﬁ  gures may understate somewhat the amount of US MBS that were ultimately owned by Europeans. Many off-balance-sheet vehicles of European banks 
were located in the United States, and purchases of asset-backed securities by these vehicles would be recorded as purchases by “US residents.” In addition, many 
vehicles of European and US global banks were located in offshore ﬁ  nancial centers, where much of the remaining USD 0.3 trillion in US asset-backed securities 
were held.
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Chart 9 examines the AAA-rated shares of different 
categories of private securities.15 The share of 
private label asset-backed securities that was rated 
AAA during the housing boom, at about 85 percent, 
dramatically exceeded the AAA-rated share of 
Chart 8
Value of mortgages outstanding
(USD billions)










Variable rate, other prime and alt-A
Prime fixed-rate and FHA/VA
Source: Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.
ABS, RMBS, & CMBS outstanding, by rating
(USD billions)














Other investment grade, private label
AAA-rated, private label
Agency MBS a)
a) Includes MBS guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises, the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA).
Sources: Flow of Funds and staff estimates based on Dealogic data.
15  Data on credit ratings for corporate bonds were obtained from Moody’s DRS data. Data on credit ratings for outstanding MBS were estimated based on new-issue 
ratings in Dealogic data.
Chart 9
Share of bonds outstanding rated AAA, by type
(%)
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Sources: For RMBS, CMBS, and ABS, staff estimates based on Dealogic data; 
for corporate ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial, Moody’s.
ﬁ  nancial corporate bonds (15 percent) and non-
ﬁ  nancial corporate bonds (3 percent). Moreover, 
whereas the AAA-rated share of corporate bonds 
was flat or declining during the height of the 
housing boom, the AAA-rated share of private label 
asset-backed securities rose slightly.
The process by which collections of loans, many 
of dubious quality, were transformed into highly 
rated structured investment products has been well 
covered by Gorton (2008, 2009) and Coval, Jurek, 
and Stafford (2008), among others. In brief, pooling 
loans and establishing tranches with a pre-established 
priority ordering for payments allowed many 
securities to be deemed much safer than the average 
loan in the underlying pool. The motivation for this 
ﬁ  nancial engineering was clear: there were proﬁ  ts to 
be made by selling securities at a price that ultimately 
proved much higher than the value of the underlying 
collateral. But, equally important, it was recognised 
that the willingness of investors to deliberately take 
on additional risk was limited. Investors were willing 
to reach for some additional yield by purchasing 
AAA-rated MBS rather than Agency debt (or sovereign 
bonds at home), but they likely would not have 
absorbed BBB-rated MBS in signiﬁ  cant quantities. 
Accordingly, the surge in ﬁ  nancial engineering to 
tranche the payouts from mortgages so as to create 
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highly rated debt securities was, at least in part, 
an endogenous response to the risk preferences of 
domestic and foreign investors. (See Nadauld and 
Sherlund, 2009; Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, and 
Willen, 2008; and Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009.)
The combination of heavy demand for highly rated 
MBS, along with the transformation of risky mortgages 
into highly rated MBS by the ﬁ  nancial services industry, 
increased the effective demand for “raw materials” –that 
is, new mortgage originations. As indicated in Chart 10, 
issuance of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) 
soared during this period, but spreads of the interest 
rates on these mortgages relative to those on conforming 
ARMs (which were guaranteed by the GSEs) continued 
to decline. The growing demand for securities backed 
by these loans on the part of investors, both foreign 
and domestic, helped keep these spreads low. 
Chart 10
Subprime adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) issuance
(thousands of loans)











Source: Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.
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In this paper, we have argued that international capital inﬂ  ows likely played an important role in lowering 
Treasury yields and returns on other apparently safe US assets, especially mortgages, in the years leading 
up to the ﬁ  nancial crisis. As highlighted by both the GSG hypothesis and the more recent literature focusing 
on the international pattern of asset supplies and preferences, these capital inﬂ  ows included purchases of 
Treasuries and Agencies by emerging market economies seeking safe assets in which to invest their current 
account surpluses. However, these capital inﬂ  ows also included purchases of highly rated private label MBS 
by investors in other advanced economies, especially in Europe, who sought a broader range of assets but 
continued to place a high value on perceived safety. Although Europe as a whole was not running a current 
account surplus during this period, unlike the GSG economies, it ﬁ  nanced purchases of US securities, 
including MBS, through issuance of a range of external liabilities. As the composition of home mortgages 
became increasingly skewed toward subprime and other risky loans, the US ﬁ  nancial services industry 
developed techniques to transform these loans into the apparently safe, AAA-rated securities demanded by 
investors at home and abroad. The subsequent bursting of the housing bubble and recognition that many of 
these securities were far riskier than had previously been recognised helped to trigger the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Looking back on the crisis, the United States, like some emerging-market nations during the 1990s, has learned 
that the interaction of strong capital inﬂ  ows and weaknesses in the domestic ﬁ  nancial system can produce 
unintended and devastating results. The appropriate response is not to try to reverse ﬁ  nancial globalisation, 
which has conferred considerable beneﬁ  ts overall. Rather, the United States must continue to work with its 
international partners to improve private sector ﬁ  nancial practices and strengthen ﬁ  nancial regulation, including 
macroprudential oversight. The ultimate objective should be to be able to manage even very large ﬂ  ows of 
domestic and international ﬁ  nancial capital in ways that are both productive and conducive to ﬁ  nancial stability. 
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